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Objecrivity and Nonfiction 
Carol Brownson 
A aajor �oal of Noel Carroll's paper ts to show that 
docu•ntary ftl• can be objective, that it ts not specially 
tainted by subjectivity as coapared to any other .edtua of 
thought. I f  we allow that vrttten wo1ks can be objective� then 
film can be just ae objective. I would like to agree vtth this 
without also holdt� that subjective/objective ts a particu­
larly useful d1st1nct1on to .ake tn tryi� to tinderstand ftl•. 
Carroll tn fact offers good reasons for dtscardtn� this ter­
minology. He gives three popular meanings of 'objective' in 
rel ation to documentary fil• and shows hov none is viable tn 
itself and that they also conflict vith each other. Rut we 
cannot si•ply redefine the term to mean what Carroll then 
argues constitutes a reasonable stat�ard of objectivity, t.e., 
·we call (or should call) a piece of work objective tn light of 
tta adherence to the practices of reasoning and evidence 
iathering tn a given field. It ts objective because it can be 
interaubjectively evalua�ed against standards of arguments and 
evidence shared by practitioners of a specific area of dis­
course.� In order to uphold this view of the standards of 
evaluation that we should apply to nonfiction ftlue, it aeemA 
obvious that we would do better to discard the objective/ 
subjective terminology in our researches tn film theory, and 
also do everything we can to carry on popular dtscusatons of 
documentary films in more illuminating tenns (Carroll himself 
uses 'tntersubjecttve'), so as to bring the very standards of 
evaluation that Carroll describes to bear on documentaries, 
without losing them in the confusion of the other too well 
established uses of the term 'objective.' 
The central argument in part I of the paper is tha� the 
standard arguments agatnet the posstbtli�y of objectivt�y in 
documentary also dell&Oliah its possibility in other areas where 
we hold that objectivity (in the sense put forth above) ta 
possible, and therefore these argumen:s cannot be correct. The 
success of this a1gument depends partly on our ftrmlv hol.d1n� 
that objectivity is possible tn other areas, and partly a� the 
critics of the objectivity of documentary holdin� this also. 
Otherwise, tf their arguments against film's objectivt�y are 
part of a wider argument for the tmposstbtlity of object1v1ty, 
we would be forced to evaluate wider skeptical ar�ur'lents to 
evaluate their criticism of film. Carroll writes, Ml do not 
think that coauaentato.ra who conclude that the nonfiction film 
is subjective intend their remarks as a �re gloss on the 
notion that everythin� is subjecttve.M (p. 7) I think "ore 
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evidence might b@ produced that they do not, since it is 
c onceivable that a wore wide-ranging skeptical view ie exactly 
what ineptrea at least acme for.s of this crttt ci••• Cwe aight 
like to think that film theories are developed entirely as a 
thoughtful re.Poase to the �rience of film aad not ai•Ply as 
a footnote to other theorie•, but I doubt that this could be 
the case.) Sa.e of t�e fil• theorists .. y not be inclined to 
hold that ·everything is subjective,· but it ia not i.mthinkable 
that they aight 'be wil ling to hold (1) that all knowledge 
clai•a are aubjective, or (2) that language ta not objective. 
These poaitioflS have been held, and they do force the abaadon­
.ent of aow.r concepts for evalueting knowledge clai•s, such as 
truth and objectivity, but they substitute others such ae 
happineaa, effe ctiven�a, predictive value, elegance, coher­
ence, noncontradiction, si•p licity, sophiaticatioo. pleasure, 
etc. If aay of the .. in attacka an the possibility of objec­
tivity in film are grounded in either of the.e aorta of argu­
ment, then Carroll's argument vtll have no force against the•· 
There aay be sow.rthing special about the •diua of fil• 
that requires that ve not associate it with other media, ao 
that arguments about other media should not auto.atically apply 
to fila, and vice versa. That special feature might be the 
role of the c.mera in relating the vorld to ua. Pictures .. de 
by ca•rae seem to be not easily equated v1th liaguistic 
aa aertiona in their .. ans of establishing reference to the 
world. The camera see.a both especially able to capture the 
world objectively, because mechanically, and inevitably bound 
to a narrow, even personal, point of vierv, giving a gliapae of 
the object in time which aay fail to catch 1 ta essence. (Thus 
a certain tradition of art criticia• attacks the Renaiaaance 
for it• introduction of linear perspective into painting in the 
belief that this elevates the individual point of view to an 
equal level of significance with what ie pictured.) 
Critic• of objectivity of fila have tried to 1ha.1 that the 
caw.rra doe.n•t capture the world mechanically. Carroll'• 
crtticia• of arguments against a special role of the ca.era in 
capturing reality i1 that ·in attempting to ehow that cineaa 
doe1 not �to.atically reproduce reality • • •  they itl8inuate that 
ciaeaa can never faithfully record, docu •nt, or bear evidence 
about the world ... Hia argu .. nt ia that •not autoaatically• 
•bould not be equated with "'never.• But the real concern of 
the argu .. nt agait\8t aut<>11atia• of the camera ta •if not 
autoaatically, then how?• A .etaphor •hared by auto.atic 
reproduction theor11ta and their critic• i• that of ·•the -1rror 
of reali.ty... If the ca.era can achieve this airroring auto­
aatically, then it i• genuinely different from language. If it 
cannot, and if it• atrroring ia not 8RChanical but intenaional, 
then it1 .. nner of aaking reference to the world could be 
eaaentially like language. Thi• line of argument would only 
1how that fil• cannot be objective i f  it ii already held that 
language cannot be objective (on •o• other groonda). Thu• a 
vierv that fil• cannot be objective growa oot of the view that 
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language CJLnnot be objective; it does not accidentally extend 
tbis far. 
A second criticism that Carroll offers of arguaenta againBt 
a special role of the ,caera in capturing reality ia that these 
arguments apply only to the shot and are extended unjustifiably 
to the film aa a vhole by trading on the a•biguity of Tpoint of 
view.' Carroll contends that ant1-objectiv1st critics have 
directed their argu•nte againBt the coeposition of the shot, 
vhich depends on caeera placellM!nt, and have unjustifiably 
applied their results to the fil• as a whole. The trouble vith 
this criticism is that it ascribes a aimpliatic afstake to hi• 
opponents. ConBider the quality of the ambiguity of 'point of 
view.• 'Point of view' does have different meanings, but they 
are not unrelated. They are derived from each other by •ta­
phoric extension. The extension occurs because the �taphor is 
apt. 'Point of view.' as simple ca.era placement, partial ly 
deter•inea compoaition of the picture (along vith arrangement 
of elements in the scene photographed). The art of the camera 
ia in getting it into a point of view such that the resulting 
composition vill e�preaa the viewpoint of the intellect. Such 
shots can then be used by the filcznnaker to build up and con­
tribute to the viewpoint (in its vtdeat sense) of the film as a 
vhole. Art and film critics often point out such relationships 
and no fallacy ta involved. The fallacies occur. acc ording to 
Carroll, when a pure theorist argues that the shot vhich 
necessarily has a point of view (as camera placement) neces­
aarily conveys an attitude (first fallacy), and that the whole 
film made up of shots necessarily conveys a subjective attitude 
(aecond fallacy). In short, the theorist's fallacious argument 
ia: 
Every ahot in a given nonfiction fil� has a p.o.v. 
Therefore, every nonfiction film is a personal vision. 
Thia argument confounds at leaat three, and poasibly five, 
aenBes of 'point of view.' But this aight not be the argument 
of at least some anti-objectivista. If a theorist attacks 
documentary�s possibility of objectivity out of a conviction of 
language's aubjectivity, then the notion of the whole film 
being subjective need not depend on showing that the ahot ia 
aubjective. Rather, their argument could be that the whole 
film is obviously aubjective inBof ar aa it haa characteristicB 
clearly like those of linguistic objects (narration, editing, 
etc.) and need not be proved to be eo. It ia only the shot 
vhich appears to make special claims to nonlinguiatic objec­
tivity, and ao it is only the obje ctivity of the ahot that 
needs to be argued againBt. Thus their arguments are only 
directed against the ahot on the grounda that the ahot ia the 
only element of the film that might llirror the vorld non­
linguiatically. The effort therefore ta only to shov that the 
way the ahot refera to the vorld is intensional ,  not mechani­
cal, and is therefore language-like. Thia vill remove t�e last 
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01-tacle for auch t�riata to go ahead and talk unrestrainedly 
of ·reading- a fila rather than having to ·see" any part of it 
even the ahot. Such a pattern of argument. vhtch claim> 
f tla ts subj�tive aa an exteoeton of th� cl•i• that language 
ta subjective. vould re.ain u ntouched by Carroll's arguments. 
II. Fiction/Nonfiction 
'Documentary f il•' is a term vhich was attached to a gr oup 
of filas al.,.,at inadvertently by John CrieTson, and vhich 
somehow stuck. It has not aee.ed particularly satisfying even 
to the father of docu11entary hiaeelf. Atteepta have been made 
to get us to atop using the term. on the gr oonds that it fails 
to adequately characterize the group of films it refers to, and 
creates aialeadtng expectat1on9 of evidence to be supplied by 
the filas and prevents ua from seeing vider poaaibUitiea of 
objectivity. The term .any have been falling back·on lately ta 
'nonfiction fil•·' 
Unlike 'documentary,' 'nonf 1ct1on fil�' does not appear to 
characterize the filCIU!ll it refers to. It projects a achema for 
the larRer classification of all fila. This ache.a is e1gn1f­
ficant becauae the uabrella term It project& ia. 'fUa' rather 
than 'art object,' and therefore it leavea open the q�ation of 
whether a given k.ind of fil• ia art or not. The category 
'fila' ia then subdivided ia.ediately into fiction and nonf ic­
tion. Thua the prob lea vith •nonfiction fila' ia not vhether 
the term adequately characterize& a group of filaa, but whether 
the ache.a it project• cute up the territory appropriately. 
There are reaaooe to think it aight not. For instance, it .ay 
fores on ua the conc lusion that fiction fil•s are fiction, and 
n onfiction filaa are nonfiction, and that therefore only the 
latter ahould be judged by atanclarda of truth. Thia ia not 
vhat ve now tend to do. To take tvo of Carroll's own exaeplea: 
(I) propaganda filaa aeea purposely to fail to uphold standards 
of truth and yet are considered nonfiction; {2) docu-dramaa 
invite judg.ent in tet118 of ataftdarda of objectivity and truth, 
though th&y are obviously fiction. (l) In addition, a signif­
icant percentage of fiction filaa make a point of realistically 
portraying ao.e niche of life, e.a •• vhat life ta like in a 
WWII U-boat (Daa Boot) or the texture of life and the �ral 
dilemmas of a atudent in California in the late 60's (The 
Graduate). Doea the fact that theae are fiction f 11•• -.ean-we 
are vroog for gently criticizing the• for .. king aiatakea in 
their portrayals o,f the eigna of atreaa in a submarine, or by 
ahoving the .atn character driving avay from Berkeley tovard 
San Francisco on the Golden Cate bridge1 vhen he is supposed to 
be hurrying tovard Berkeley froa Loa Angeles? More signifi­
cantly, are ve 11aking a aiailar category •fatake vhen ve 
criticize a fila for being untrue to the nature of the baaic 
hu11an dile�a it preaenta? Do ve not think of fiction films 
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as being even more capable than nonfiction fil.s of conveying 
deeper truths of human nature and the nature of the world, 
though they may not be defined by their capability of doing so� 
I take it that if Carroll is offering elements of a defini­
tion of nonfiction fil•. it is one which will show it to be a 
characterizable and genuine category, and not ai=ply one that 
is left over after fiction fil• is picked out. One argument 
for there being a category of nonfiction fila is i•plied by 
Carroll's description of obje ctivity. That is that the cate­
gory is suggested by the coaparison with written works. 
Fiction/nonfiction is a categorization familiar to readers of 
the New York Times Book Review. Two classes of best sellers 
are divided this way. What characteristics of these written 
works does the categorization depend on? -Nonfiction- includes 
at least two diet books, and does look like the left-ov�r 
category after -fiction- is collected in the first. 8ut the 
New York Times 8ook Review also divides paperback best sellers 
into two categories. These are mass market and trade. 'Mass 
Market' is defined as -soft cover books usually sold at news­
stands, variety stores and supermarkets, as well as in book­
stores, M and 'trade paperbacks' are -soft-cover books usually 
sold in bookstores and at an avera�e price hi�her than mass 
market paperbacks.- The basis of this categorization is merely 
cmn.mercial, and not any intrinsic characteristics of the 
contents of the books. Grierson established the tradition that 
the films made by his groups would be distributed non-com.er­
cially. Perhaps such a commercial distinction is just what 
lies behind our ca tego rizat ion of Mdocu11>entary films." 
Thou�h popular bookstores may divide their books according 
to a fiction/nonfiction categorization. libraries do not. The 
Library of Congress classification does include a section PZ 
which is fiction. But there is no category -nonfiction·· which 
includes the rest of the books in the library. Goodman•s works 
are to be found in the philosophy section, and not in "nonfic­
tionM. This also indicates that fiction/nonfiction is wierely a 
division of conJmerc1al convenience. Why then, is it commer­
cially convenient to make this distinction? The 'nonfiction' 
list of best sellers includes a diet book or two, so10e exercise 
books, various Mhow-to's,- a collection of light parables, and 
biography. The distinction seems to be made, both here and in 
trade bookst,ores, so that people can sort out entertainment 
from books which make some contribution (however feeble) to our 
knowledge and abilities. One is for fun, the other work and 
improvement. 
There is a long standing assumption in Western thought that 
knowledge and ple asure are incompatible goals in human en­
deavors. This assumption of a dichotomy between knowledge and 
pleasure may also contribute to the distinction between fiction 
and non-fiction film. Fiction film is thus the category of 
works designe� to entertain and give pleasure, and thus we are 
not required to apply standards of truth and knowledge to it; 
non-fiction is the category whose goal is knowledge, and the 
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dtecovery and dieaeatnation of truth, and it thue re�uires us 
to apply standard• of crittctea appropriate to the pursuits of 
knouledse. 'nlie dietinction aleo aeew1 to prevent u• from 
u•i� truth aa a etandard of evaluation applicable to ftcttona, 
becauee their goal 1• not truth but pleasure. 
But here it bee�• aiS(Ttificant that this categorization 
appears to take no position on vhether film ts art or not. It 
11 a categorization vhich locate• ftl• as a tool, vhtch .ay be 
applied to t� ends of art, or thoee of other fields (ect­
encee, politic•, hiatory, anthropology. etc.). Thus it .. y be 
poeeible to u.e thie categortiation to cut acroee the old 
dichotomy betveen pleasure and knowledge by breaking d()IW'tl the 
aaeuaption that if art ta in any vay concerl\ed vith truth, then 
it haa to be in coepetitton vtth the eciencea to discover and 
record trutha. Thia vtll only happen if all categortee of film 
can be art, and if truth in aome form can be relevant to ell 
cetegoriee. It is all too po1eible however that this cate�or­
tzation vtll be uaed to coaf ine art to the ficttoaa, vith all 
the nonfiction• being seen as specie• of the search for know­
ledge and the only categortea in vhtch truth ts relevant. In 
that caae the nev terminology vill have gained ua nothing. 
At places in his paper Carroll refers to his proposed des­
cription of objectivity as it should apply to film •• if he 
vere 118k1ng a contribution to the definition of the category 
*nonfiction ftlm.N {For example: *eome .ay feel that thte ta 
not a very helpful definition • • •  • and *tn defe1l8e of •Y partial 
definition • •• • {p. 16)) I think thta ia a •ialeading descrip­
tion of vhat he accoapli1he1 in thi1 paper. lather than givt� 
a partial definition of nonf tction he haa deacribed a 
re11onable and re1pectably rigoroua 1tandard of evaluation ap­
plicable to filma vhtch lay clat• to objectivity or truth {or 
vhatever tenD ve choo1e as 1110dern replacements for these 
terme). Such a atandard ts welcome both in film theory and 
in the practice of f1l1111SBking. It i 1  velco.e in film theory 
becau1e it clears 9Way a lot of nonaenae about the possibility 
of film• bei� objective and undervritee and encourages reapon­
atble and detailed criticism of particular films by the appli­
cation of atandarde appropriate to the field vhich the film 
invokee, rather than inhibiting such detailed crittciem by 1up­
plyin1t ove:rly get>eral atandarda that are supposed to apply to 
film • •  a vhole. It 11 velcoae i n  film practice becau1e it en­
courage• the rigor of thought and coD.Btruction that fil• 11 
capable of b-Jt aometimee netelecte on the purely aophiatic 
ground• that auch rigor of thought ia not po1atble in film. Aa 
• atanderd of evaluation, Carroll'• deacription of 'objec­
tivity' can apply to both fiction and nonfiction fil11&. lut it 
fa pri11arily appropriate to those films which do not proclaim 
the•aelvea a1 fiction• and therefore exempt fraat judgmente in 
terine of certain ie1ue1 of exiaten� of object• and event• 
pictured. 
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